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SUMMARY 
 
The awarding of termination payments to departing company directors and senior 
executives has attracted a lot of controversy in many jurisdictions in light of the 
excessive nature and size of termination packages, as well as the corporate 
governance flaws in the process by which these payments are determined. 
Termination payments are frequently perceived to be rewards for failure in view of 
the large packages that have been paid to company executives on termination of 
their service contracts, often following poor financial performance and staff 
retrenchments. This article examines the legislative controls on termination payments 
in the UK under the Companies Act 2006, and in Australia under the Corporations 
Act 2001. It then evaluates the position in South Africa under the Companies Act 71 
of 2008 in light of the approaches followed by the UK and Australia. The article 
concludes that the provisions of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, relating to directors’ 
and executives’ termination payments are inadequate to promote transparency, 
accountability and certainty. It further makes proposals for more robust regulation of 
directors’-and executive-termination payments under the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Termination payments, commonly known as “golden handshakes”, are 
packages awarded to company directors and senior executives upon 
termination of their service contracts or retirement from office. They are 
usually contained in directors’ and executives’ contracts of service and 
provide a guarantee that they will receive a lucrative cash payment and 
other benefits in the event of a termination.
1
 
    The practice of awarding termination payments to departing company 
directors and senior executives has been a subject of increasing public and 
                                                          
1
 The various types of payments or benefits that may be received under termination 
agreements include inter alia guaranteed annual basic salary and bonuses for a specified 
period of time, automatic or accelerated vesting of share-based payments and payments in 
lieu of notice. 
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shareholder scrutiny in most jurisdictions in the post 2008–2009 global 
financial-crisis period. This is mainly due to the nature of termination 
payments, the sheer size of these payments and the serious corporate 
governance challenges often found in the determination of these payments.
2
 
Termination payments are also frequently perceived to be rewards for failure 
in view of the large packages that are paid to company executives on 
termination of their service contracts, often following poor financial 
performance and staff retrenchments.
3
 
    The purpose of this article is to explore the approaches followed by the 
UK and Australian legislatures in seeking to control the glaring corporate 
governance deficiencies associated with termination payments, and to 
suggest legislative reforms for South Africa in this area of corporate law. The 
article first discusses the justifications for the termination payments made by 
companies to departing directors and senior executives. It further considers 
the corporate governance challenges in this area, before examining the 
legislative controls on termination payments in the UK under the Companies 
Act 2006,
4
 as amended, and in Australia under the Corporations Act 2001, 
as amended.
5
 The article then evaluates the position in South Africa under 
the Companies Act 71 of 2008, as amended, in light of the approaches of 
both the UK and Australia. Lastly, the article makes proposals for legislative 
reform in South Africa as well as some concluding remarks. 
 
2 THE  RATIONALE  FOR  TERMINATION  PAYMENTS 
 
Various reasons have been advanced for the provision of lucrative 
termination payments by companies to their departing executives. According 
to proponents of this practice, termination-payment agreements are 
necessitated by the need on the part of companies to attract and retain 
competent directors and senior executives.
6
 They argue that it would be 
difficult for a company that does not enter into these arrangements to 
engage competent directors and executives, particularly where such 
directors and executives are leaving secure employment or positions.
7
 In the 
same vein, they maintain, a company that does not enter into termination-
payment agreements risks losing its skilled directors and senior executives 
to competitors.
8
 
                                                          
2
 Shields, O’Donnell and O’Brien “The Bucks Stop Here: Private Sector Executive 
Remuneration in Australia” A Report prepared for the Labor Council of New South Wales 
2003 http://www.researchgate.net/publication/242042789 (accessed 2016-02-27) 8. 
3
 See, eg, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia “Corporations Amendment 
(improving accountability on termination payments) Bill 2009 Explanatory Memorandum” 
(2009) https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2009B00146/Download (accessed 2016-01-20) 
11–12. 
4
 Hereinafter “the UK Companies Act 2006”. 
5
 Hereinafter “the Australian Corporations Act 2001”. 
6
 Hood and Benge “Golden parachute agreements: reasonable compensation or disguised 
bribery?” 1985 53 UMKC LR 199 204. In this article the authors discuss the rationale for 
employment contracts that guarantee lucrative financial payments to company executives 
when their companies change control on an acquisition or merger. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Ibid. 
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    Notably, termination-payment arrangements are made in advance to the 
directors and executives. As such, they provide security to incoming 
company directors and executives against involuntary or early termination 
from employment.
9
 The security provided by these arrangements 
presumably encourages the directors and executives to take risks and 
actively pursue strategies that will enhance the value of the company and 
benefit its shareholders.
10
 It has also been asserted that the security 
provided by the termination payments may play a role in mitigating the fear 
of dismissal during the directors’ and executives’ tenure in office.
11
 This, it is 
argued, may aid in discouraging directors and executives from concealing 
negative information from shareholders in order to avert the possibility of 
removal from office, or from shirking when they feel that their removal has 
become likely.
12
 Thus, according to David Yermack, termination payments 
may make departure a more attractive option to under-performing executives 
than holding on to their positions, even in situations where the board is too 
weak to remove them, or where the board does not have adequate 
information to justify their removal.
13
 
    Another reason given for termination payments is that these lucrative 
payments may serve as a mechanism for damage control when directors 
and executives are dismissed.
14
 They may encourage the dismissed 
directors or executives to leave the company “quietly” and not to divulge the 
company’s confidential information to competitors or compete with the 
company.
15
 Moreover, termination payments may also serve to prevent 
disgruntled executives from instituting costly litigation against the company.
16
 
    A further justification for termination payments is that they represent a 
special recognition of service
17
 and provide a mechanism by which the board 
of directors evaluates the achievements of the individual director or 
executive at the end of his term of office and reward him accordingly.
18
 
 
3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES 
ASSOCIATED  WITH  TERMINATION  PAYMENTS 
 
Despite the arguments in favour of the practice of awarding termination 
payments to company directors and senior executives presented above, 
termination arrangements raise serious questions about corporate 
governance most of the time. There is often a lack of transparency in regard 
                                                          
9
 Yermack “Golden handshakes: Separation pay for retired and dismissed CEOs” 2006 41 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 237 240. 
10
 Yermack 2006 41 Journal of Accounting and Economics 240−241. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Ibid. See also Shields, O’Donnell and O’Brien 2003 http://www.researchgate.net/publication 
/242042789 7. 
15
 Yermack 2006 41 Journal of Accounting and Economics 241−242; Shields, O’Donnell and 
O’Brien 2003 http://www.researchgate.net/publication/242042789 7. 
16
 Yermack 2006 41 Journal of Accounting and Economics 242. 
17
 Shields, O’Donnell and O’Brien 2003 http://www.researchgate.net/publication/242042789 7. 
18
 Yermack 2006 41 Journal of Accounting and Economics 239−240. 
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to the basis for, and the scale of, these payments.
19
 Indeed, very few 
companies have transparent mechanisms in place for calculating termination 
payments.
20
 Termination arrangements are also frequently imbedded in 
most executive contracts in South Africa, while they are not disclosed in the 
remuneration policies put to shareholder approval. Shareholders and other 
stakeholders are usually informed of these lucrative payments when 
payments have already been made. Consequently, in some jurisdictions 
legislation requires advance disclosure of any termination-payment 
arrangement in order to mitigate potential abuse.
21
 
    In addition, there is lack of fairness and objectivity in the procedures by 
which termination payments are determined. In a country such as South 
Africa the directors’ powers of management are statutorily entrenched.
22
 The 
responsibility for determining the remuneration packages of directors and 
senior executives (including the termination packages) ultimately rests with 
the board of directors. South Africa also has a unitary board structure, 
comprising of both executive and non-executive directors. Therefore, there is 
a very high potential for conflict of interests when directors have to 
determine the termination arrangements of fellow directors. 
    While it is common practice for companies to establish so-called 
independent remuneration committees, comprising non-executive directors 
to determine company directors’ and executives’ remuneration packages, 
the role of such committees is only an advisory one. The final authorization 
is the prerogative of the board.
23
 In any event, the independence and 
effectiveness of remuneration committees are hampered by a variety of 
social, economic and psychological factors, including feelings of friendship 
and loyalty amongst executive and non-executive directors.
24
 It has been 
                                                          
19
 Shields, O’Donnell and O’Brien 2003 http://www.researchgate.net/publication/242042789 8. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 See paragraphs 4 and 5 below for a discussion of the relevant provisions of the UK 
Companies Act 2006 and the Australian Corporations Act 2001. See also s 951 of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 in the USA, which 
provides for a non-binding shareholder vote on any agreements or understandings that the 
company has with any of its named executive officers concerning any type of compensation 
that is based on, or otherwise relates to the acquisition, merger consolidation, sale, or other 
disposition of all or substantially all of the assets of the company. 
22
 S 66(1) of 71 of 2008. 
23
 Davis, Geach, Mongalo Companies and other Business Structures in South Africa 3ed 
(2013) 142−143. See also Institute of Directors in Southern Africa Practice Notes “A guide 
to the application of King III: Remuneration” October 2012 http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/ 
www.iodsa.co.za/resource/collection/24CB4885-33FA-4D34-BB84-E559E336FF4E/King_III 
_Remuneration_practice_note_April_2013.pdf (accessed 2016-01-27). 
24
 Yablon “Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay” 1992 92 Columbia 
LR 1867 1873; Hill “What Reward Have Ye? Disclosure of Director and Executive 
Remuneration in Australia” 1996 14 Company and Securities LJ 232 235; Ezzamel and 
Watson “Market Comparison Earnings and the Bidding-Up of Executive Cash 
Compensation: Evidence from the United Kingdom” 1998 41 The Academy of Management 
Journal 221 222; Sykes “Overcoming Poor Value Executive Remuneration: resolving the 
manifest conflicts of interest” 2002 10 Corporate Governance: An International Review 256 
257; Mongalo “Shareholder activisim in the United Kingdom highlights the failure of 
remuneration committees: lessons for South Africa” 2003 120 SALJ 756 760−763; Bebchuk 
and Fried “Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues” in Kieff and Paredes (eds) 
Perspectives on Corporate Governance (2010) 115−130; Ablen “Remunerating ‘Fairly and 
Responsibly’ The ‘Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
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observed that the majority of boards function like a closed club, with non-
executive directors also serving as directors of comparable companies.
25
 In 
essence, executive directors often serve on each other’s boards and 
approve each other’s remuneration packages. Accordingly, it is submitted, 
the determination of termination payments becomes problematic since it 
occurs in an inherently biased set up. It is further submitted that informed 
shareholder oversight regarding decisions on termination payments would 
serve to counterbalance the defects in the way these payments are 
determined.
26
 This clearly calls for greater transparency in termination 
payments. 
    The sheer size of termination payments raises concern, especially in light 
of the pay gap between senior executives and the rest of the company 
employees.
27
 This is a particularly serious concern in the South African 
context.
28
 Unreasonable pay disparities could lead to conflicts between 
company management and employees which, in turn, could negatively 
impact on the company’s operations. The amounts of these exit payments 
should thus be sensitive to pay and employment conditions elsewhere within 
the company. Very large termination packages during periods of 
retrenchments and significant cost-cutting can also have a negative impact 
on a company’s workforce morale. 
    The sheer size of termination payments also raises concerns in regard to 
linking pay packages to performance.
29
 Linking pay to performance is 
generally viewed as one of the ways of aligning the interests of company 
directors and executives with not only those of shareholders but those of 
other stakeholder groups as well. However, as already mentioned, 
termination payments are often viewed as rewards for failure, where they are 
awarded despite poor performance.
30
 
    It is submitted, therefore, that termination payments to company directors 
and executives need to be controlled through legislation in a manner that will 
promote transparency and accountability. This would be in line with section 
7(b)(iii) of the Companies Act of 2008 which lists encouraging transparency 
and high standards of corporate governance among the purposes of the 
                                                                                                                                        
Recommendations’ of the ASX Corporate Governance Council” 2003 25 Sydney LR 555 
558−560. 
25
 Yablon 1992 92 Columbia LR 1873; Hill 1996 Company and Securities Law Journal 235; 
Ezzamel and Watson 1998 41 The Academy of Management Journal 222; Sykes 2002 10 
Corporate Governance: An International Review 257; Mongalo 2003 120 SALJ 760-763; 
Bebchuk and Fried in Kieff and Paredes (eds) Perspectives on Corporate Governance 
115−130; Ablen 2003 25 Sydney LR 558−560. 
26
 Ablen 2003 25 Sydney LR 560; Hill 1996 Company and Securities Law Journal 235. 
27
 Shields, O’Donnell and O’Brien 2003 http://www.researchgate.net/publication/242042789 8. 
28
 South Africa has been described as one of the most unequal nations in the world. See 
Massie, Collier and Crotty Executive salaries in South Africa: Who should have a say on 
pay? (2014) xxii−xxxiii and 27−28. See also Inchauste, Lustig, Maskekwa, Purfield and 
Woolard “Fiscal policy and redistribution in an unequal society: the case of South Africa” 
2014 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/publication/south-africa-economic-up 
date-fiscal-policy-redistribution-unequal-society (accessed 2015-08-28); Oxfam “Even it up: 
time to end extreme inequality” 2015 https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_ 
attachments/cr-even-it-up-extreme-inequality-291014-summ-en.pdf (accessed 2015-08-28). 
29
 Shields, O’Donnell and O’Brien 2003 http://www.researchgate.net/publication/242042789 8. 
30
 Ibid. 
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Act.
31
 The legislative controls should in addition serve to promote certainty in 
determining the types of payments or benefits considered to be termination 
payments. 
 
4 THE  UK 
 
The provisions on payments for loss of office in relation to UK-registered 
companies are contained in sections 115-222 of the UK Companies Act 
2006. Additional restrictions in relation to quoted companies
32
 are provided 
for in sections 420−422 of the UK Companies Act 2006, sections 79-82 of 
the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 as well as The Large and 
Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2013.
33
 
 
4 1  Meaning  of  payment  for  loss  of  office 
 
Section 215 of the UK Companies Act 2006 defines “payment for loss of 
office” to mean a payment made to a director or past director of a company − 
 
“(a) by way of compensation for loss of office as director of the company, 
 (b) by way of compensation for loss, while director of the company or in 
connection with his ceasing to be a director of it, of − 
(i) any other office or employment in connection with the management of 
the affairs of the company, or  
(ii) any office (as director or otherwise) or employment in connection with 
the management of the affairs of any subsidiary undertaking of the 
company, 
 (c) as consideration for or in connection with his retirement from his office as 
director of the company, or 
 (d) as consideration for or in connection with his retirement, while director of 
the company or in connection with his ceasing to be a director of it, from − 
(i) any other office or employment in connection with the management of 
the affairs of the company, or 
(ii) any office (as director or otherwise) or employment in connection with 
the management of the affairs of any subsidiary undertaking of the 
company.”
34
 
 
    Section 215(2) expressly states that the references to “compensation” and 
“consideration” include benefits otherwise than in cash and references to 
“payment” have a corresponding meaning. The comprehensive definition of 
“payment for loss of office” above also applies to the new Chapter 4A of Part 
                                                          
31
 See also s 7(i) and (j) of 71 of 2008 which provide that the purposes of this Act are to inter 
alia balance the rights and obligations of shareholders and directors within companies and 
to encourage the efficient and responsible management of companies. 
32
 A “quoted company” is defined in s 385(2) of the UK Companies Act 2006 to mean a 
company whose equity share capital has been included in the Official List in accordance 
with Part 6 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, or is officially listed in a 
European Economic Area State, or is admitted to dealing on either the New York Stock 
Exchange or Nasdaq. 
33
 Hereinafter “the 2013 Regulations”. 
34
 This section is contained in Chapter 4 of Part 10 which deals with transactions with directors 
requiring approval of members. 
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10 which deals with the directors of quoted companies.
35
 Notably, the term 
“remuneration payment”, as defined in section 226A(1), specifically excludes 
a “payment for loss of office”.
36
 
 
4 2 Restrictions on payments for loss of office for UK-
registered companies 
 
4 2 1 Shareholder  approval  of  payments  for  loss  of  office 
 
Sections 217, 218 and 219 of the UK Companies Act 2006 require 
shareholder approval for payments for loss of office, including those made in 
connection with transfer of the undertaking, property or shares of the 
company.
37
 This requirement is applicable to a UK-registered company that 
is not a wholly-owned subsidiary of another body corporate (hereafter 
referred to as a “UK-registered company”).
38
 
    Requiring shareholder approval clearly helps to limit the board’s discretion 
over payments made in return for loss of office. It also promotes 
transparency and accountability within company boards. It enables 
shareholders to vote against termination packages that are considered to be 
unreasonable. 
    Section 115(3) of the UK Companies Act 2006 specifically provides that a 
payment to a person connected with a director or to any person at the 
direction of, or for the benefit of, a director or a person connected with him, 
is considered as a payment to the director. Accordingly, payments to all such 
persons require the shareholders’ approval. The expression “payment by a 
person” also includes payments made by another person at the direction of, 
or on behalf of, the first person.
39
 This is intended to prevent circumvention 
of the requirement that payments for loss of office receive the approval of 
shareholders by making the payment through connected persons. 
    The UK Companies Act 2006 provides for exceptions to the requirement 
of shareholder approval of payments for loss of office. In terms of sections 
220(1) shareholder approval is not required for a payment made in good 
faith in the following circumstances: 
                                                          
35
 S 226A(1) of the UK Companies Act 2006, as inserted by s 80 of the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2013. 
36
 S 226A(1) of the UK Companies Act 2006, as inserted by s 80 of the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2013. 
37
 Notably, s 217(2) further prohibits a subsidiary from making a payment for loss of office to a 
director of its holding company, unless the payment has been approved by a resolution of 
the shareholders of each of the companies. S 218(1) prohibits the making of a payment for 
loss of office by any person to a director of a company in connection with transfer of the 
undertaking or property of the company, unless the payment has been approved by a 
resolution of the shareholders of the company. Where the payment is in connection with the 
transfer of the undertaking or property of a subsidiary of the company, the payment must be 
approved by a resolution of the shareholders of each of the companies. In terms of s 219(1) 
a payment for loss of office by any person to a director of the company in connection with 
share transfer in the company or its subsidiary, resulting from a takeover bid, also requires 
approval by the shareholders. 
38
 S 217(4), 218(4) and 219(6) of the UK Companies Act 2006. 
39
 S 115(4). 
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 in discharge of an existing legal obligation; 
 by way of damages for breach of such an obligation; 
 by way of settlement or compromise of any claim arising in connection 
with the termination of a person’s office or employment, or 
 by way of pension in respect of past services. 
    In addition, the exception applies where the payment, including other 
relevant payments, does not exceed £200.
40
 
    In order to promote transparency and meaningful shareholder 
participation, sections 217, 218 and 219 provide that a resolution approving 
a payment for loss of office must not be passed unless a memorandum 
setting out particulars of the payment, including its amount, is made 
available to the shareholders of the company. 
 
4 2 2 Consequences  for  contravention  of  the  provisions 
 
In terms of section 222(1)(a) if a company makes a payment for loss of office 
without shareholder approval as required by section 217, the payment is 
held by the recipient on trust for the company making the payment. 
Moreover, a director who authorized the payment is jointly and severally 
liable to indemnify the company for any loss resulting from the payment.
41
 In 
the event that the contravening payment for loss of office is made in 
connection with the transfer of the whole or any part of the undertaking or 
property of the company or its subsidiary (section 218), it is held by the 
recipient in trust for the company whose undertaking or property is 
transferred or is proposed to be transferred.
42
 If the contravening payment is 
made in connection with a share transfer resulting from a takeover bid, it is 
held by the recipient in trust for persons who have sold their shares, based 
on the offer.
43
 All the expenses incurred by the recipient in distributing that 
sum will be borne by him and not deducted from that sum.
44
 
    The civil penalties provided, including the joint and several liability of 
directors, would strengthen compliance with the requirement for shareholder 
approval of payments for loss of office. The requirement that the recipient of 
a retirement benefit that has been given without shareholder approval must 
hold such benefit on trust, ensures the accountability of the recipient. 
 
                                                          
40
 S 221(1). 
41
 S 222(1)(b). 
42
 S 222(2). This would also be the consequence where a payment is in contravention of ss 
217 and 218. See s 222(4). 
43
 S 222(3)(a). See also s 222(5) which provides that if a payment is in contravention of ss 217 
and 219, then s 222(3) applies rather than subsection (1), unless the court orders 
otherwise. 
44
 S 222(3)(b). 
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4 3 Additional restrictions on payments for loss of 
office for quoted companies 
 
4 3 1 Disclosure of payment for loss of office arrangements 
 
In addition to the requirements discussed above, the 2013 Regulations 
require each quoted company to disclose in the directors’ remuneration 
policy
45
 information relating to all directors’ service contracts,
46
 and the 
company’s policy on payment for loss of office.
47
 Should the directors’ 
service contracts not be available for inspection at the company’s registered 
office, the details of where these contracts are kept must be provided.
48
 
Further, if the contracts are available on a website, a link to that website 
must be given.
49
 The above requirements apply equally to the terms of 
letters of appointment of directors.
50
 This helps to bring transparency into 
termination arrangements found in directors’ service contracts and letters of 
appointment. 
    Furthermore, the directors’ remuneration policy must set out the 
company’s approach to the determination of payments for loss of office.
51
 
This must include an indication of how each component of the payment will 
be calculated, and an explanation of whether the director’s performance 
during the period of service is relevant to any exercise of discretion.
52
 
    It is submitted that these requirements help to focus the attention of 
company boards on termination arrangements. They compel quoted 
companies to devise defined mechanisms for calculating payments to 
departing directors for loss of office. They also help to give company 
stakeholders insight into the termination payments awaiting the directors. 
 
4 3 2 Disclosure of payment for loss of office in the annual 
remuneration report 
 
In terms of regulation 16 of the 2013 Regulations, the annual directors’ 
remuneration report for each quoted company must disclose payments for 
loss of office for each person who has served as a director of the company 
at any time during the financial year or any previous year. It must set out the 
total amount of any payment for loss of office, broken down into each 
component comprised in that payment and the value of each component.
53
 
                                                          
45
 The directors’ remuneration policy is defined in s 226A(1) of the UK Companies Act 2006 
(inserted by s 80 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013) to mean the policy of a 
quoted company with respect to the making of remuneration payments and payments for 
loss of office. 
46
 Regulations 30−32 of the 2013 Regulations. 
47
 Regulations 36−37. 
48
 Regulation 31. 
49
 Ibid. 
50
 Regulation 32. 
51
 Regulation 37. 
52
 Ibid. 
53
 Regulation 16(a). 
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An explanation of how each component was calculated must be provided.
54
 
Where any discretion was exercised in respect of the payment, an 
explanation of how such discretion was exercised must be given.
55
 These 
disclosure requirements provide shareholders and other company 
stakeholders with insight on how the total termination package is comprised, 
as well as how it has been calculated. 
 
4 3 3 Shareholder control over payments for loss of office 
 
Shareholders of quoted companies may exercise control over termination 
payments in a number of ways, including through expressing their views on 
the formulation of the directors’ remuneration policy and voting on the 
resolutions to approve the directors’ remuneration policy.
56
 Shareholders 
are, therefore, able to engage with company boards on, amongst other 
things, the termination-payment provisions proposed to be included in the 
directors’ remuneration policy. 
    Section 439 of the UK Companies Act 2006 further gives shareholders of 
a quoted company an annual advisory vote on a resolution to approve the 
annual directors’ remuneration report at an accounts meeting. If the 
resolution to approve the annual directors’ remuneration report is not passed 
the company must put the directors’ remuneration policy to a binding 
shareholder vote the following year.
57
 This gives teeth to the advisory vote 
and compels companies to take shareholder concerns on the aspects of the 
annual directors’ remuneration report relating to, amongst others, 
termination payments, more seriously. 
    The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 introduced further 
restrictions on directors’ termination payments under the new Chapter 4A of 
the UK Companies Act 2006.
58
 According to these restrictions, any payment 
for loss of office that is made to a person who is, or has been, a director of a 
quoted company, must be consistent with the approved remuneration 
policy.
59
 Alternatively, a payment for loss of office which is not consistent 
with the approved remuneration policy, must be approved by a resolution of 
the shareholders of the company as required by section 226C. It is, 
                                                          
54
 Regulation 16(b). 
55
 Regulation 16(d). 
56
 In terms of s 439A read with s 421(2A) of the UK Companies Act 2006 the directors’ 
remuneration policy must be approved by a binding ordinary resolution of the shareholders 
every three years (or sooner if the company wishes to make any changes to the 
remuneration policy). See also regulation 40 of the 2013 Regulations which provides that 
the directors’ remuneration policy must contain a statement of whether, and if so, how, any 
views expressed to the company by shareholders (whether at a general meeting or 
otherwise) were taken into account in the formulation of the directors’ remuneration policy. 
57
 S 439A(2) of the UK Companies Act 2006 as inserted by s 79 Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform Act 2013. 
58
 Ch 4A of the UK Companies Act 2006 was inserted by s 80 of the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2013. This Chapter, according to s 226F(1) of the UK Companies 
Act 2006, does not affect the requirements for shareholder approval which apply in relation 
to the company under Chapter 4 (i.e. restrictions on payments for loss of office for UK-
registered companies). 
59
 S 226C(1)(a) of the UK Companies Act 2006. In terms of s 226(2) the approved directors’ 
remuneration policy is the most recent remuneration policy to have been approved by a 
resolution passed by the shareholders of the company in general meeting. 
LEGISLATIVE CONTROLS ON DIRECTOR … 627 
 
 
therefore, imperative for quoted companies to adhere to the termination-
payment arrangements, as disclosed in the company’s approved 
remuneration policy. 
    Notably, the restrictions on directors’ termination payments apply not only 
to payments made by quoted companies, but also to payments for loss of 
office made by any person to a person who is, has been or is to be a director 
of a quoted company. These include payments made to a person connected 
with, or at the direction of, or for the benefit of the said director of a quoted 
company.
60
 Thus, the restrictions imposed on payments to directors for loss 
of office cannot be circumvented by making such payments through other 
connected persons. 
    Section 226D(1) of the UK Companies Act 2006 provides inter alia that a 
resolution, approving a payment for loss of office, must not be passed unless 
a memorandum setting out the particulars of the payment, including its 
amount, has been disclosed to shareholders. In terms of section 226(D)(2) 
the memorandum must explain the ways in which the payment is 
inconsistent with the company’s approved remuneration policy. These 
requirements are aimed at further enhancing transparency in termination 
payments. 
 
4 3 4 Consequences of contravention of the provisions by 
quoted companies 
 
The UK Companies Act 2006 provides for severe criminal and civil 
consequences in the event that a quoted company fails to comply with the 
provisions on termination payments. Some of these apply to remuneration 
matters generally, whilst others apply specifically to termination payments. 
For instance, failure to comply with the requirement to prepare a directors’ 
remuneration report for each financial year constitutes an offence.
61
 Further, 
directors may be held criminally liable if a directors’ remuneration report that 
does not comply with the requirements of the UK Companies Act 2006 is 
approved.
62
 These criminal consequences would apply where a directors’ 
remuneration policy or the annual directors’ remuneration report fails to 
comply with the provisions on termination payments discussed above. A 
person guilty of the offence is liable on conviction on indictment, to a fine 
                                                          
60
 S 226A(7) of the UK Companies Act 2006. In terms of s 226A(7)(8), s 252 of the UK 
Companies Act applies for the purposes of determining whether a person is connected with 
a person who has been, or is to be, a director of a company as it applies for the purposes of 
determining whether a person is connected with a director. Connected persons include inter 
alia: members of the director’s family; a body corporate with which the director is connected 
as defined in s 254; a person acting in his capacity as a trustee of a trust, the beneficiaries 
of which include the director, or a person who is connected with him; a person acting in his 
capacity as partner of the director, or of a person who is connected with that director; a firm 
in which the director is a partner; a firm in which a partner is a person who is connected with 
the director; a firm in which a partner is a firm in which the director is a partner, or in which 
there is a partner who is connected with the director. 
61
 S 420(2) of the UK Companies Act 2006. 
62
 The offence is committed by every person who was a director of the company immediately 
before the end of the period for filing accounts and reports for the financial year in question, 
and failed to take all reasonable steps for securing compliance with that requirement. See s 
420(2)(a) and (b) of the UK Companies Act 2006. 
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and on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding the statutory 
maximum.
63
 
    In addition, section 226E of the UK Companies Act 2006, provides for civil 
consequences where a payment for loss of office is made without 
shareholder approval as required by section 226C. In terms of section 
226E(1) an obligation, however arising, to make such payment which would 
be in contravention of section 226C, has no effect. If a payment for loss of 
office is made in contravention of section 226C, it is held by the recipient on 
trust for the company or the person making the payment.
64
 Where such 
payment is made by a company, the directors who authorized the payment 
are jointly and severally liable to indemnify the company for any loss 
resulting from the payment.
65
 
    The harsh penalties discussed above would compel company boards to 
carefully consider the statutory requirements on termination payments that 
must be addressed in the remuneration policy and in the annual directors’ 
remuneration report. They would ensure that the boards comply with the 
provisions in the directors’ remuneration policy. The strict penalties would 
also help to strengthen transparency and shareholder control over 
termination payments. 
 
5 AUSTRALIA 
 
In Australia, termination payments to company directors and senior 
executives are regulated by the Corporations Act 2001 and the Corporations 
Regulations 2001. Division 2 of Part 2D.2 of the Australian Corporations Act 
2001 contains restrictions on benefits given in connection with retirement 
from an office or position if a person has held a managerial or executive 
office. Section 200AA specifies when a person holds a managerial or 
executive office in the company. In the case of listed companies, a person 
holds a managerial or executive office in the company during a financial year 
if the person’s details were included in the directors’ report for that previous 
financial year for the company in accordance with section 300A(1)(c).
66
 In 
                                                          
63
 S 420(3)(a) and (b) of the UK Companies Act 2006. See also s 440 which provides that 
failure to give the requisite notice of the resolution for approval of director’s remuneration 
report constitutes an offence by every officer of the company who is in default. 
64
 S 226E(2)(a). However, this does not apply to a situation where the payment for loss of 
office is made to a director of a quoted company in connection with the transfer of the whole 
or any part of the undertaking or property of the company or its subsidiary. In such a 
situation the payment is held by the recipient on trust for the company whose undertaking or 
property is being transferred (or is proposed to be transferred). See s 226E(3). Furthermore, 
if the payment for loss of office is made (in contravention of section 226C) in connection 
with a transfer of shares in the company, or in its subsidiary resulting from a takeover bid, 
the payment is held by the recipient on trust for persons who have sold their shares as a 
result of the offer. The expenses incurred by the recipient in distributing that sum amongst 
those persons will be borne by the recipient and not retained out of that sum. See s 
226E(4). 
65
 S 226E(2)(b). However, if the director shows that he has acted honestly and reasonably, 
and the court considers that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, he ought to 
be relieved of liability, the court may relieve the director, either wholly or in part, from liability 
on such terms as the court thinks fit. See section 226E(5). 
66
 S 200AA(1) of the Australian Corporations Act 2001. In terms of s 300A(1)(c) details must 
be given in the directors’ report for each person who is a member of the key management 
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the case of any other body corporate, a person holds a managerial or 
executive office if the person is a director of the body corporate, or holds any 
other office or position in connection with the management of the body 
corporate’s affairs that is held by a person who also holds an office of 
director of the body corporate or a related body corporate.
67
 Thus the 
provisions apply somewhat differently to listed companies and all other 
companies. 
    Nevertheless, the ambit of the restrictions relating to retirement benefits, 
as defined, under the Australian Corporations Act 2001, extends to cover 
directors, executives and key-management personnel of the company.
68
 
This is in contrast to the UK where the requirements on payments for loss of 
office only apply to company directors. 
    The restrictions also apply to all companies incorporated under the 
Australian Corporations Act 2001. This is also the case under the UK 
Companies Act 2006 where, as discussed above, the restrictions on 
payments for loss of office apply to all corporate entities which are UK-
registered companies. 
 
5 1 Meaning  of  “retirement  benefit” 
 
It is essential to specify the kinds of payments or benefits that are subject to 
the restrictions contained in Division 2 of Part 2D.2. Section 200AB(1) of the 
Australian Corporations Act 2001 defines “benefit” for the purposes of 
Division 2 of Part 2D.2 to include a payment or other valuable consideration, 
any kind of real or personal property, any legal or equitable estate or interest 
in real or personal property, any legal or equitable right and a thing specified 
in regulations made for the purposes of this section.
69
 In terms of paragraph 
2D.2.02(1) of the Corporations Regulations 2001 payments considered to be 
benefits include inter alia: 
 Any kind of pension other than a pension paid from a superannuation 
fund or a superannuation annuity. 
 Amounts paid as a voluntary out-of-court settlement in a matter relating to 
the termination of employment. 
 Payments made as part of restrictive covenants, restraint of trade clauses 
or non-compete clauses the value of which, when added to the value of 
any other payments made or payable in connection with the person’s 
                                                                                                                                        
personnel for the consolidated entity (if consolidated financial statements are required) or 
for each member of the key management personnel for the company (if consolidated 
financial statements are not required. 
67
 S 200AA(3)(a) and (b). 
68
 S 9 of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 provides that the term “key-management 
personnel” has the same meaning as in the accounting standards. In terms of Accounting 
Standard AASB 124.9 “key-management personnel” refers to those persons having 
authority and responsibility for planning, directing and controlling the activities of the entity, 
directly or indirectly, including any director (whether executive or otherwise) of that entity. 
69
 S 200AB(1)(a)–(e). 
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retirement, exceed the payment limit set by section 200G of the 
Australian Corporations Act 2001 (i.e. the retiree’s annual base salary).
70
 
    Section 200A(1)(a) provides that a benefit is given in connection with a 
person’s retirement from an office or position if it is given by way of 
compensation for (or otherwise in connection with) the loss by the person of 
the office or position, or in connection with the person’s retirement from the 
office or position. Section 200A(1)(b) further specifies that giving a benefit 
includes making the payment where the benefit is a payment, and 
transferring the interest where the benefit is an interest in property. Giving a 
benefit occurs when the person giving the benefit is obliged to do so under a 
contract.
71
 
    In terms of section 200A(1A) a benefit is given in connection with a 
person’s retirement from an office or position if it is given in the 
circumstances specified in the regulations. These are circumstances in 
which: 
 the benefit is the automatic vesting of share-based payments for a person 
on or as a result of retirement from office or position;  
 the benefit is the accelerated vesting of share-based payments for a 
person on or as a result of retirement from office or position, and  
 the benefit is a payment made to a person in lieu of the giving of notice of 
termination.
72
 
    Section 200A(1)(e) defines “retirement from an office or position” widely to 
include loss of the office or position, resignation from the office or position, 
as well as death of persons at a time when they hold the office or position. 
    The effect of the broad definition of what constitutes a retirement benefit is 
to cover all the types of compensation that are awarded to company 
directors and senior executives upon termination of their service contracts or 
retirement from office. The detailed definition of what constitutes a retirement 
benefit is aimed at clarifying the types of payments that are subject to the 
restrictions on the payment of retirement benefits, and also to clarify the 
types of payments that are not. 
 
5 2 Shareholder  approval  of  retirement  benefits 
 
Section 200B(1) of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 prohibits a 
company, an associate of the company and a prescribed superannuation 
                                                          
70
 However, in terms of section 200AB(2) of the Australian Corporations Act 2001, read with 
paragraph 2D.2.02(1) of the Corporations Regulations 2001, a benefit does not include the 
following, inter alia: deferred bonuses; payments from defined benefits superannuation 
schemes; genuine superannuation contributions paid by an employer or employee; genuine 
accrued benefits payable under a law (otherwise than because of breach of contract or 
breach of trust); such as payment of annual leave, long service or sick leave; payments 
under a requirement imposed by a law of another country; a reasonable payment made in 
accordance with the company’s policy that applies to all employees, as a result of a genuine 
redundancy, and having regard to the length of a person’s service; and payments from 
prescribed superannuation funds due to death or incapacity. 
71
 S 200A(1)(c). 
72
 Par 2D.2.03 of the Corporations Regulations 2001. 
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fund in relation to the company
73
 from giving a person a benefit (as defined 
in paragraph 5 1 above) in connection with a person’s (the retiree’s) 
retirement from office or position of employment in a company or a related 
body corporate if the office or position is a managerial or executive office, 
unless the giving of the benefit is approved by shareholders.
74
 This 
requirement also applies where the retiree has held a managerial or 
executive office in the company, or a related body corporate at any time 
during the last 3 years prior to his or her retirement.
75
 
    Notably, the recipient of the benefit needs not be the retiree. This would 
prevent circumvention of the restrictions on retirement benefits through the 
giving of benefits to related parties. Furthermore, section 200A(2) provides 
that, if person A gives benefit A for the purpose, or for purposes including 
the purpose, of enabling or assisting someone to give a person a benefit in 
connection with the retirement of person B from an office or position, then 
person A is taken to give benefit A in connection with person B’s retirement 
from that office or position. This prevents the circumvention of the 
restrictions on termination benefits through the giving of related benefits. 
    Similarly, section 200C prohibits the giving of a benefit to a person who 
holds or has held a managerial or executive office in connection with the 
transfer of the whole or any part of the undertaking, or property of the 
company unless the giving of the benefit is approved by shareholders.
76
 
Again, the recipient of the benefit need not be the person who holds or has 
held a managerial or executive office in a company or a related body 
corporate. This is so because section 200C further prohibits the giving of the 
benefit to such person’s spouse or relative (or the spouse of the relative) or 
associate (or the spouse of the associate) without shareholder approval. 
    Although retirement benefits are generally subject to shareholder approval 
in terms of section 200B(1), the Australian Corporations Act 2001 provides 
for specific circumstances where the requirement for shareholder approval 
does not apply.
77
 Notably, section 200F(2) provides that shareholder 
approval is not required if the retirement benefit is a genuine payment of 
                                                          
73
 “Superannuation fund” is defined in s 200B(1A)(4) of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 
to mean a provident, benefit, superannuation or retirement fund. Such superannuation fund 
is considered to be a prescribed superannuation fund in relation to a company if the 
company or an associate of the company gives a benefit to the superannuation fund for the 
sole purpose of enabling or assisting the superannuation fund to give to a person a benefit 
in connection with the retiree’s retirement from an office or position in the company or a 
related body corporate. A superannuation fund is also considered to be a prescribed 
superannuation fund in relation to a company if the former gives a benefit to another 
superannuation fund solely for the purpose of enabling or assisting the other 
superannuation fund to give to a person a benefit in connection with the retiree’s retirement 
from an office or position in a company or a related body corporate. See s 200B(1A)(1) and 
(2). 
74
 In terms of s 200E(1B) the resolution approving the giving of the benefit must be passed at 
a general meeting of the company. If the company is a subsidiary of a listed domestic 
corporation, the resolution must be passed at a general meeting of the listed corporation. If 
the company is a subsidiary of an unlisted domestic corporation (which is not itself a 
subsidiary of a domestic corporation), the resolution must be passed at a general meeting 
of the holding company. 
75
 S 200B(1)(b). 
76
 S 200E which provides for approval by shareholders. 
77
 S 200F, 200G and 200H. 
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damages for breach of contract, or is given to the person under a contract 
with the company as the consideration for agreeing to hold the office or 
position, provided that the value of the benefit, when added to the value of 
all other benefits already given in connection with the person’s retirement, 
does not exceed the retiree’s annual base salary. In the same vein, section 
200G(1) provides that shareholder approval is not required if the retirement 
benefit is for past services rendered to the company or a related body 
corporate, and the value of the benefit, when added to the value of any other 
benefits already given, does not exceed the retiree’s annual base salary. 
Thus only the retirement benefits in excess of the retiree’s annual base 
salary would be subject to shareholder approval.
78
 
    The prescribed threshold for shareholder approval of retirement benefits 
has been criticized on the basis that the one-year base-salary threshold is 
too low and will likely be circumvented by companies through increasing 
their directors’ and executives’ base salaries.
79
 It has thus been contended 
that the shareholder-approval threshold be set at two years total 
remuneration instead of one-year base pay.
80
 Nevertheless, it is submitted 
that the requirement of shareholder approval supports transparency and the 
accountability of company boards in determining retirement benefits. 
Shareholders are able to reject retirement benefits, proposed by company 
boards, if they are considered as being excessive or amounting to rewards 
for failure. 
    For there to be shareholder approval for the giving of the retirement 
benefit, section 200E(2) requires that the details of the benefit must be 
disclosed in, or accompany, the notice of the general meeting that is to 
consider the resolution. In the event that the proposed benefit is a payment, 
the amount of the payment must be disclosed. If the amount cannot be 
ascertained at the time of the disclosure, then the manner in which that 
amount is to be calculated and any circumstances that will, or is likely to, 
affect the calculation of that amount, must be set out.
81
 In any other event, 
the money value of the proposed benefit must be disclosed. If the value of 
the benefit cannot be ascertained at the time of the disclosure, then the 
manner in which it is to be calculated and any circumstances that will, or is 
                                                          
78
 In an effort to increase certainty, the term “base salary” is defined in regulation 2D.2.01 of 
the Corporations Regulations 2001 to mean (1) the specified components of a short-term 
employee benefit that are not dependent on the satisfaction of a performance condition and 
are paid during the relevant period; (2) a superannuation contribution that is not dependent 
on the satisfaction of a performance condition and is paid during the relevant period; (3) a 
specified share-based payment that is not dependent on the satisfaction of a performance 
condition and that is paid during the relevant period; and (4) a liability or prospective liability 
to pay tax in respect of a fringe-benefit taxable amount under the Fringe Benefit Tax 
Assessment Act 1986 or the Fringe Benefits Tax Act 1986, that relates to the provision of a 
matter specified in item (1), (2) or (3) above. 
79
 Australian Institute of Corporate Directors “Submission by The Australian Institute of 
Company Directors to Treasury in response to the Exposure Draft: Corporations 
Amendment (Improving Accountability on Termination Payments) Bill 2009” May 2009 
http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/executive-remuneration/submissions/sub059-part 
3.pdf (accessed 2016-01-28) 8−9. 
80
 Australian Institute of Corporate Directors http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/ 
executive-remuneration/submissions/sub059-part3.pdf 13. 
81
 S 200E(2)(a)(i) and (i) of the Australian Corporations Act 2001. 
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likely to, affect the calculation of that value, must be disclosed.
82
 These 
requirements further enhance transparency and would enable shareholders 
to cast their votes in an informed manner. 
    Notably, section 200E expressly states that shareholder approval does 
not relieve a director from any duty to the company in connection with the 
giving of the benefit, whether statutory
83
 or otherwise, and whether of a 
fiduciary nature or not. It is, therefore possible for disgruntled minority 
members to use the statutory derivative action to recover inappropriate 
termination payments on behalf of the company.
84
 
 
5 3 Consequences of contravention of the provisions 
 
The contravention of the provisions of the Australian Corporations Act 2001, 
dealing with retirement benefits, may lead to severe criminal or civil penalties 
for both individuals and corporate entities. The giving of benefit in 
contravention of section 200B or 200C (i.e. without shareholder approval) 
constitutes an offence of strict liability, resulting in criminal penalties.
85
 In the 
case of section 200B, the offence is committed by the a company, an 
associate of the company or a prescribed superannuation fund in relation to 
the company that gives the retirement benefit in connection with the 
retiree’s, or someone else’s retirement without shareholder approval. In the 
case of section 200C, the offence is committed by any person who gives a 
benefit to a person dealing with the transfer of the whole or any part of the 
undertaking or property of the company. Furthermore, receiving a benefit if 
the giving of the benefit contravenes section 200B or 200C, constitutes an 
offence of strict liability.
86
 
    Section 200J provides for civil consequences where an entity contravenes 
section 200B by giving a retirement benefit to a person. In terms of section 
200J(1), read with subsection (2), the whole of the amount of the benefit or 
of the money value of the benefit (where the benefit is not a payment) is 
deemed to be received by the recipient on trust, and must be repaid by the 
recipient to the giver. In addition, the whole of the amount or value of the 
benefit remains a debt due to the giver, and may be recovered in a court of 
competent jurisdiction.
87
 
                                                          
82
 S 200E(2)(b)(i) and (i). These requirements are in addition to any other law that requires 
disclosure to be made with respect to giving or receiving a benefit. 
83
 See s section 180, 181, 182, 183 and 184 of the Australian Corporations Act 2001. 
84
 See Cummings Engineering Holdings Pty Ltd ACN 001 794 743 [2014] NSW SC 250 in 
which the New South Wales Supreme Court, relying on s 200E(4) held that the directors 
were liable to compensate the company for the loss caused by awarding an improper 
termination payment on the basis that they acted in breach of the duty to act in good faith in 
the best interests of the company, the duty not to improperly use their position to gain an 
advantage for themselves or someone else, and the general fiduciary duties. 
85
 S 200B(1A) and 200C(2) of the Australian Corporations Act 2001. This offence may be 
committed by a person who holds or has held a managerial or executive office in a 
company or related body corporate (person A), or the spouse of person A, or a relative of 
person A or of the spouse of such a person, or an associate of person A or the spouse of an 
associate of such a person. 
86
 S 200D. 
87
 S 200J(1A). 
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    Regarding the giving and receiving of retirement benefits in contravention 
of sections 200B and 200C as offences of strict liability, seems quite 
punitive. It is also worth noting that section 200J requires that the whole of 
the amount of a payment or of the money value of the benefit must be held 
on trust by the recipient, and repaid to the giver “even though giving the 
benefit would not have contravened section 200B if that amount or value of 
the benefit had been less”.
88
 This provision also appears very punitive. It is, 
therefore, submitted that the punitive criminal and civil penalties would exert 
strong pressure on companies to adhere to the provisions on retirement 
benefits. They reflect the strong position that the Australian lawmakers have 
adopted in order to deter excessive retirement benefits, and to ensure 
meaningful shareholder participation in the determination of these 
payments.
89
 The requirement that the recipient of a retirement benefit that 
has been given without shareholder approval must hold such benefit on 
trust, is aimed at increasing the accountability of the recipient, especially 
where the recipient has failed to repay it to the giver immediately.
90
 
 
5 4 Additional controls on retirement benefits in regard 
to listed companies and the “two-strikes” rule. 
 
Section 300(1)(e)(vii) of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 requires listed 
companies to disclose information about the termination payments in the 
directors’ and senior executives’ contracts annually in the directors’ 
remuneration report. Such information must include, in the case of a person 
who is employed by the company under a contract, the duration of the 
contract, the periods of notice required to terminate the contract and the 
termination payments provided for under the contract. This information must 
be given for each person who is a member of the key-management 
personnel for the company or for the consolidated entity (if consolidated 
financial statements are required).
91
 
    However, the actual contracts would not be subject to examination by the 
shareholders. This is so because section 300A(1)(e)(vii) of the Australian 
Corporations Act 2001 does not go as far as the 2013 Regulations in the UK 
which require quoted companies to provide details of where the directors’ 
contracts and letters of appointment are kept (in cases where these are not 
available for shareholder inspection at the company’s registered office), 
which may include giving a link to a specific website in the event that the 
contracts are available on a website. 
    In terms of section 250R(2), read with subsection (3) of the Australian 
Corporations Act 2001, a resolution to adopt a directors’ remuneration report 
must be put to a non-binding advisory vote of the shareholders at a listed 
company’s AGM.
92
 Shareholders of listed companies who are unhappy with 
                                                          
88
 S 200J(2). 
89
 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/ 
C2009B00146/Download 16. 
90
 Ibid. 
91
 S 300A(1)(e), read with paragraph (c) of the Australian Corporations Act 2001. 
92
 In terms of s 249L(2)(a) the notice of the annual general meeting of a listed company must 
inform shareholders that a resolution for the approval of the directors’ remuneration report 
will be put at the annual general meeting. 
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the termination-payments arrangements in the directors’ and executives’ 
contracts are further empowered under the “two-strikes” rule to vote against 
the remuneration report, and to potentially require that all the directors resign 
and stand for re-election within 90 days.
93
 This would compel the board of 
directors to take shareholder concerns in relation to termination payments 
seriously.
94
 
 
6 SOUTH  AFRICA 
 
In South Africa legislative controls on directors’ and prescribed officers’ 
termination payments are contained in section 30(4) of the Companies Act
95
 
and its related provisions. Although the King IV Report on Corporate 
Governance for South Africa 2016 contains important provisions regarding 
termination payments to directors and prescribed officers, these provisions 
are not binding. This part will examine the adequacy of the relevant 
provisions of the Companies Act.
96
 
 
6 1 Definition  of  “termination  payment” 
 
Although section 30(4)(c) of the Companies Act
97
 requires  disclosure in the 
company’s annual financial statements of any compensation paid in respect 
of loss of office to current or past directors or prescribed officers, there is no 
definition of “compensation paid in respect of loss of office” in the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008. Notably, the broad definition of the term 
“remuneration” in section 30(6) (in the context of information disclosure in 
the annual financial statements) does not include “compensation paid in 
respect of loss of office”. It is, therefore, not clear what “compensation paid 
in respect of loss of office” encompasses. This is in contrast to the UK 
Companies Act 2006 and the Australian Corporations Act 2001 which 
contain a separate and comprehensive definition of “payment for loss of 
office” and “retirement benefit”, respectively. A clear definition of “a 
termination payment” or “compensation paid in respect of loss of office” is 
essential in view of the complex remuneration arrangements and packages 
                                                          
93
 A 25% (or more) vote against the adoption of the remuneration report at the AGM (earlier 
AGM) is considered to be the first strike. If at the subsequent AGM (the later AGM) the 
adoption of the remuneration report is rejected by at least 25% of the votes (this is 
considered to be the second strike) a resolution (the spill resolution) must be put to vote that 
another shareholders’ meeting (the spill meeting) be held within 90 days, and the 
company’s directors would be required to resign and stand for re-election at the spill 
meeting. See s 250V(1) of the Australian Corporations Act 2001. See also Kovačević 
“Executive Remuneration Developments in Australia: Responses and Reactions” 2012 23 
The Economic and Labour Relations Review 99 104; and Luiz “Executive Remuneration 
and Shareholder Voting” 2013 25 SA Merc LJ 267 273 for a discussion of the “two strikes” 
rule. 
94
 See also s 300A(1)(g) of the Corporations Act which provides that, if comments were made 
on the remuneration report that was considered at the company’s most recent AGM, and 
when a resolution for the adoption of the remuneration report was voted against by at least 
25% of the votes cast, the remuneration report for the next financial year must also include 
an explanation of the board’s proposed action in response. If the board does not propose 
any action, the board’s reasons for inaction must be included. 
95
 71 of 2008. 
96
 Ibid. 
97
 Ibid. 
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in modern times. It should be clear which elements constitute “compensation 
paid in respect of loss of office” in order to provide companies and their 
stakeholders with certainty. 
 
6 2 Disclosure  of  termination  payments 
 
In terms of section 30(4)(c) the annual financial statements of a company 
that are required in terms of the Companies Act
98
 to be audited, must 
disclose the amount of any compensation paid in respect of loss of office to 
current or past directors or individuals who hold or have held any prescribed 
office in the company.
99
 The “details of service contracts” of current directors 
and prescribed officers of the company must also be disclosed.
100
 
    Furthermore, section 30(5) requires the information to be disclosed under 
subsection (4) to show the amount of any “remuneration” or “benefits” paid 
to or receivable by persons in respect of − 
 
“(a) services rendered as directors or prescribed officers of the company; or 
 (b) services rendered while being directors or prescribed officers of the 
company − 
(i) as directors or prescribed officers of any other company within the 
same group of companies; or  
(ii) otherwise in connection with the carrying on of the affairs of the 
company or any other company within the same group of companies.” 
 
    The disclosure of the amount of compensation paid in respect of loss of 
office and the details of service contracts, is welcome. However, there are 
significant omissions in section 30(4) and its related provisions. First, section 
30(5) uses the terms “remuneration” and “benefits” and does not refer to 
“compensation paid in respect of loss of office”. It is, therefore, not clear 
whether the disclosure requirements of section 30(5)(b) are applicable to 
compensation paid in respect of loss of office. It is not clear whether the 
amounts paid in respect of loss of office as director or prescribed officer of 
any other company within the same group of companies, must be disclosed. 
It is also not clear whether the amounts paid in respect of loss of any other 
office or employment in connection with the carrying on of the affairs of the 
company, or any other company within the same group of companies, must 
be disclosed. It is submitted that these amounts should be disclosed, as is 
the case under the UK Companies Act 2006 and the Australian Corporations 
Act 2001. 
    Secondly, the Companies Act
101
 does not require companies to provide a 
detailed disclosure of the various components of the total termination 
                                                          
98
 71 of 2008. 
99
 S 30(2)(a) of 71 of 2008 provides that the annual financial statements of a public company 
must be audited. In the case of any other profit or non-profit company, the annual financial 
statements must be audited if so required by the regulations made in terms of s 30(7), 
taking into account whether it is desirable in the public interest, having regard to the 
economic or social significance of the company, as indicated by any relevant factors, 
including its annual turnover, the size of its workforce, or the nature and extent of its 
activities. See s 30(2)(b) of 71 of 2008. 
100
 S 30(4)(e) of 71 of 2008. 
101
 71 of 2008. 
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package, including an explanation of how each component has been 
calculated. It appears that merely disclosing the total amount of the 
termination package would be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 
section 30(4)(c). It is submitted that the various components making up the 
total termination package should be disclosed and explained separately in 
order to achieve greater transparency.  
    Thirdly, while the requirement for disclosure of the “details of service 
contracts” of current directors and prescribed officers in section 30(4)(e) is 
welcome, this provision does not specify which “details of service contracts” 
must be disclosed. There is thus no guarantee that detailed information on 
termination payments will be disclosed in the company’s annual financial 
statements. It is submitted, in this regard, that the Companies Act
102
 should 
further require companies to provide shareholders with access to the 
directors’ and prescribed officers’ service contracts and letters of 
appointment. This would create greater transparency in relation to 
compensation for loss of office arrangements which are embedded in such 
contracts and letters of appointment. In the UK, as discussed above, if the 
directors’ service contracts are not kept available for inspection at the 
company’s registered office, the company must provide details of where the 
contracts are kept, or a link to a website on which the contracts are 
available. Providing company shareholders access to the entire contractual 
arrangements enables them to scrutinize the specific terms of the contracts. 
    Fourthly, the remuneration information disclosed in the annual financial 
statements in accordance with section 30(4) is not subject to shareholder 
approval. Therefore, even if detailed information on termination payments is 
disclosed under section 30(4), there is nothing to limit the discretion of 
company boards to award excessive termination packages to directors and 
executives despite poor performance. In contrast, an annual directors’ 
remuneration report is subject to an advisory shareholder vote under both 
the UK Companies Act 2006 and the Australian Corporations Act 2001. 
Even though the vote is not binding on companies, a negative vote has 
serious consequences for the company and its directors under both statutes, 
as discussed above. This gives teeth to the advisory vote and would compel 
companies in these two jurisdictions to take shareholder concerns on, 
amongst other matters, the aspects related to termination payments, more 
seriously. 
 
6 2 1 Disclosure of the policy on termination payments 
 
The Companies Act
103
 does not require companies to formulate and disclose 
their policies on termination payments.
104
 This is in contrast to the 2013 
Regulations in the UK which, as discussed above, requires the directors’ 
remuneration policy to set out the company’s approach on the determination 
of payments for loss of office, including an indication of how each 
component of the payment will be calculated. It is submitted that the 
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Companies Act
105
 should contain a provision requiring companies to have in 
place clearly defined policies governing termination payments. In addition, 
the companies should be required to disclose such policies publicly. 
 
6 3 Shareholder control over termination payments 
 
The extent of the shareholder control over termination payments under the 
Companies Act
106
 is severely limited. The presentation of the audited annual 
financial statements to the shareholders’ meeting, as required by section 
30(3)(d), affords shareholders an opportunity to engage with the board of 
directors on directors’ and prescribed officers’ termination payments that are 
disclosed in the statements.
107
 This form of engagement may, however, be 
foiled by the inadequate disclosure requirements on the termination 
payments discussed above. 
    Furthermore, the timing of the disclosure of termination payments under 
the Companies Act
108
 is flawed. Section 30(4)(e) requires disclosure of the 
amount of any compensation in respect of loss of office after the payment 
has already been made. The disclosure may take place several months 
following the making of the payment. Thus shareholder engagement on the 
actual termination payments awarded to departing directors and prescribed 
officers may add little value since it will occur after the event. It is, therefore, 
submitted that companies should be required to disclose the termination 
arrangements and the actual payments prior to payment, as is the case 
under the UK Companies Act 2006 and the Australian Corporations Act 
2001. 
    A further drawback of the Companies Act
109
 is that it does not provide for 
shareholder approval of compensation in respect of loss of office. Although 
section 66(8) and (9) provides that the remuneration of directors for their 
service as such must be approved by a special resolution of the 
shareholders in advance, there is no definition in the Companies Act
110
 in 
regard to the meaning of “remuneration” in the context of section 66(8) and 
(9).  The only definition of “remuneration” is contained in section 30(6), which 
defines “remuneration” broadly for purposes of disclosure in the annual 
financial statements. However, the broad definition of remuneration in 
section 30(6), as discussed above, does not include compensation in 
respect of loss of office. 
    By contrast, the UK Companies Act 2006 and the Corporations Act 2001 
specifically require termination payments to be approved by the company’s 
shareholders in advance. In the absence of an equivalent requirement in 
South Africa there is nothing to limit the discretion of the boards of directors 
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to pay exorbitant, and often controversial, termination packages to former 
directors and executives despite poor performance. 
    Notably, the Companies Act
111
 has no equivalent provision to section 
227(1)(a) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973.
112
 This provision prohibited the 
company from making any payment, or granting any benefit or advantage to 
“any director or past director of the company or of its subsidiary company or 
holding company or of any subsidiary of its holding company by way of 
compensation for loss of office, or as consideration for or in connection with 
his retirement from office”, unless full particulars with respect to the 
proposed payment, benefit or advantage have been disclosed to the 
shareholders and the making of the payment, or the grant of the benefit or 
advantage has been approved by special resolution.
113
 This presumably 
gave shareholders some form of control over termination packages payable 
to directors for loss of, or retirement from office.
114
 
 
6 4 Consequences of contravention of the provisions 
 
Failure to disclose the amount of any compensation paid in respect of loss of 
office or details of directors’ service contracts, as required by section 
30(4)(c) and (e) of the Companies Act,
115
 may lead to civil consequences, 
particularly where the non-disclosure would render the financial statements 
false or misleading in a material respect. This is so because section 
77(3)(d)(i) provides that a director of a company is liable for any loss, 
damages or costs sustained by the company as a direct or indirect 
consequence of the director’s signing, consenting to or authorizing the 
publication of any financial statements that were false or misleading in a 
material respect, despite having known that the statement was false, 
misleading or untrue. A director may be held jointly and severally liable with 
any other person who is or may be held liable for the same act.
116
 It is also 
important to note, in this context, that the Companies Act also provides for 
general civil liability for contravention of its provisions.
117
 This general 
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provision serves as a remedy to curb or deter contravention of the 
Companies Act. 
    As discussed above, the UK Companies Act 2006 provides for criminal 
penalties where the company has failed to put the directors’ remuneration 
report to shareholder approval. The Australian Corporations Act 2001 
provides for criminal penalties where termination payments are made 
without shareholder approval. In addition, both the UK Companies Act 2006 
and the Australian Corporations Act 2001 provide for civil consequences 
where a termination payment is made without the requisite shareholder 
approval. This is not the case in South Africa under the Companies Act,
118
 
which does not require termination payments to be approved by a resolution 
of the shareholders. 
 
7 RECOMMENDATIONS  FOR  SOUTH  AFRICA 
 
The Companies Act
119
 is lagging behind the UK Companies Act 2006 and 
the Australian Corporations Act 2001 in regard to the regulation of directors’ 
and executives’ termination payments. It is submitted that the legislative 
techniques developed in the UK and Australia should be considered and, 
with the necessary adaptations, introduced to strengthen the Companies 
Act.  It is, therefore, suggested that the following amendments should be 
made to the Companies Act in order to strengthen transparency, 
accountability and certainty in the area of termination payments, as well as 
to align the Companies Act with the legislative trends in these leading 
jurisdictions: 
 The Companies Act should provide an appropriate definition of 
“compensation in respect of loss of office” in order to clarify the kinds of 
payments and benefits that will qualify as “compensation in respect of 
loss of office” and which would, therefore, fall within the ambit of the 
provisions on termination payments. Such definition should include cash 
payments and other benefits to present or past directors or prescribed 
officers as compensation for loss of office as director or prescribed 
officer, as well as for loss of any other office, or employment in 
connection with the management of the affairs of the company or its 
subsidiary. The ambit of the provisions should also cover a payment to a 
person connected with a director (or prescribed officer), as well as a 
payment to any person at the direction of, or for the benefit of, a director 
(or prescribed officer) or a person connected with him/her. 
 The Companies Act should require shareholder approval for payments for 
loss of office, including payments for loss of office made in connection 
with transfer of the undertaking, property or shares of the company as is 
required in the UK and Australia. In the case of a subsidiary making a 
payment for loss of office to a director or prescribed officer of its holding 
company, approval by a resolution of the shareholders of each of the 
companies should be required. Where the payment is in connection with 
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the transfer of the undertaking or property of a subsidiary of the company, 
the payment must be approved by a resolution of the shareholders of 
each of the companies. 
 Before a resolution approving a payment may be passed by the 
shareholders, the size and the breakdown of the termination payments 
should be disclosed and clearly explained to the shareholders. 
 The above requirements should apply to every company which is 
registered in South Africa, save for a company that is a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of another company. 
 The requirement of shareholder approval should, however, not relieve the 
directors from their duties to the company in connection with the making 
of the payment, as is the case in Australia. This would serve as a 
protection to the minority shareholders. 
 The Companies Act should require companies that are presently required 
to comply with remuneration-disclosure requirements of section 30(4) to 
disclose termination-payments arrangements in their remuneration 
policies which should be subject to formal shareholder approval. 
Companies should be required to disclose sufficient information on the 
mechanisms for calculating termination payments. There should be 
disclosure of the policy that determines the company’s approach to all 
termination payments. 
 Section 30(4) should further be amended to provide shareholders access 
to the directors and prescribed officers’ service contracts and letters of 
appointment. 
 Section 30(4) should also be amended to require companies to disclose, 
in addition to the amount of any compensation paid in respect of loss for 
loss of office, a detailed breakdown of each component comprised in that 
payment and the value of each component, as well as an explanation of 
how each component has been calculated. 
 The remuneration information disclosed in terms of section 30(4) should 
be subject to formal shareholder approval as is the case in the UK and 
Australia. 
 In order to strengthen compliance, the Companies Act should provide for 
direct and harsher consequences for both companies and individuals that 
do not comply with the provisions on termination payments. 
 The Companies Act should require a termination payment that has been 
made in contravention of its provisions to be repaid by the recipient to the 
giver immediately. In addition, the Companies Act should provide that a 
termination payment that has been made in contravention of its 
provisions, must be held by the recipient on trust for the company or the 
person having made the payment. 
 
8 CONCLUSION 
 
The practice of awarding termination packages to departing company 
directors and senior executives has been a subject of increasing public and 
shareholder scrutiny in most jurisdictions due to the nature and the sheer 
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size of golden handshakes, as well as the serious corporate governance 
challenges in the determination of these payments. There is a need to have 
in place an appropriate framework for the regulation of termination payments 
in order to promote transparency and accountability. 
    The article has evaluated the legislative controls on termination payments 
in South Africa under the Companies Act
120
 in light of the relevant provisions 
of the UK Companies Act 2006 and the Australian Corporations Act 2001. It 
has paid particular focus on the definitions of what constitutes a termination 
payment, shareholder control over termination payments, disclosure of 
termination payments and the penalties for contravention of the provisions 
on termination payments. It is submitted that the Companies Act
121
 is lagging 
behind the UK Companies Act 2006 and the Australian Corporations Act 
2001 in these aspects. 
    Although section 30(4) of the Companies Act
122
 requires disclosure in the 
company’s annual financial statements of any compensation paid in respect 
of loss of office to current or past directors or prescribed officers, there are 
significant omissions in this section and its related provisions. Moreover, the 
remuneration report disclosed in the annual financial statements in 
accordance with section 30(4), is not subject to shareholder approval. The 
Companies Act
123
 does not provide for shareholder approval of payments for 
loss of office. 
    It is submitted that the provisions of the Companies Act
124
 relating to 
directors’ and executives’ termination payments are inadequate in promoting 
transparency, accountability and certainty. It is, therefore, submitted that the 
legislative controls on termination payments in the UK Companies Act 2006 
and the Australian Corporations Act 2001 should be considered and, with 
the necessary adaptations, introduced in the Companies Act
125
 in order to 
address the corporate-governance concerns on termination payments, whilst 
providing companies with certainty. This would be in line with section 7(b)(iii) 
which lists encouraging transparency and high standards of corporate 
governance as purposes of the Companies Act.
126
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